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The Axiom of Self-Interest from 
Adam Smith to Jean-Baptiste Say
Pierre Force
The reception of Adam Smith sʼ Wealth of Nations in France and in Conti-
nental Europe was very much tied to the fortunes of the French translation 
that Germain Garnier (1754–1821) published for the fi rst time in 1802. 
This translation was quickly accepted as authoritative. In 1803, Jean-
Baptiste Say praised Garnier sʼ translation as “the only one that is worthy 
of the original” (xxiij, n. 1).1 The abundance of endnotes and the exten-
sive preface clearly designated La richesse des nations as a canonical 
text. In the 1843 edition of the Garnier translation, Adam Smith sʼ work 
reached the fi nal stage in the process of canonization. As Kenneth Car-
penter (2002, lxi) puts it, this edition “served as a foundation work for the 
academic discipline of economics in France, no doubt to some extent even 
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1. “La traduction de Smith par Garnier est la seule qui soit digne de l oʼriginal.” All quotes 
preserve the original spelling.
2. The 1843 version of the Garnier translation remained the standard edition of The Wealth 
of Nations in French until the 1995 translation by Paulette Taieb. For a comprehensive study 
of the reception of Adam Smith in English, French, German, Russian, Polish, Spanish, Portu-
guese, Japanese, and Chinese, see Tribe and Mizuta 2002.
internationally.”2 The editor, Adolphe Jérôme Blanqui (1798–1854), who 
had succeeded Jean-Baptiste Say as the holder of the political economy 
chair at the Conservatoire des arts et métiers, included notes and com-
ments by all the principal economists in Europe: Say, Bentham, Malthus, 
Ricardo, Buchanan, Sismondi, and von Storch, among others. As a result, 
The Wealth of Nations “was no longer an English effort, no longer an 
English and French work, no more just the labor of two people, but rather 
a work of many hands from throughout Europe, all people working to 
develop a body of knowledge” (Carpenter 2002, lxii). In the fi rst half of 
the nineteenth century French was still the language of choice for intel-
lectual exchange, and many economists were more comfortable reading 
Smith in French rather than in the original English. As Keith Tribe (2003, 
162) explains, Smith sʼ ideas “generally became known through the work 
of translators and commentators,” the most important one being Jean-
Baptiste Say, who “wrote in a language that educated Europeans could 
read and wrote in a style that was considered more accessible than that 
of Smith.” Therefore, the dissemination of Smith sʼ ideas occurred in no 
small part through Say sʼ commentary and interpretation of the Garnier 
translation.3 Two examples of those educated Europeans who read Smith 
in Garnier sʼ French were Storch and Marx. Heinrich von Storch, the 
German-Russian economist who composed his Cours d éʼconomie poli-
tique for the sons of the Emperor of Russia in 1815, lifted large segments 
of his text from Garnier sʼ translation and from Say sʼ Traité d éʼconomie 
politique.4 (After Storch accused Say of plagiarism, Say [1825] published 
a terse note in the Revue encyclopédique to set the record straight.) Karl 
Marx became acquainted with political economy in 1843–44 through 
extensive readings of Say sʼ Traité and Garnier sʼ translation of The Wealth 
of Nations.5
Garnierʼs Choice of Words
Given the importance of the Garnier translation, one may suspect that 
Garnier sʼ understanding of Smith played a tacit but signifi cant role in the 
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3. Say himself became acquainted with Smith sʼ work in the original English in the 1790s.
4. See for instance volume 1, pages 72–73, of Storch 1815, where Smith sʼ famous passage 
on the baker and the butcher appears (without acknowledgment) in Garnier sʼ translation.
5. His readings also included Ricardo, Mill, and McCulloch, all in French. See Marx 
1982. Also see Marx sʼ excerpts from the Garnier translation of Smith (with commentary and 
partial translation into German) in Marx 1981. Marx used the original 1802 edition.
development of economic science in Continental Europe.6 This will seem 
especially relevant if we recall that several translations of The Wealth of 
Nations had been published before, and that these translations differ from 
Garnier sʼ in some important respects. In this article, I will focus on the 
translation of one word: self-love. This word appears only twice in the 
book, but both occurrences are in the same strategic place: the oft-quoted 
passage in the second chapter of book 1, where Smith ([1776] 1976, 
I.ii.2) discusses the causes of the division of labor (occurrences of self-
love in bold):
But man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and 
it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will 
be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, 
and shew them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what 
he requires of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, 
proposes to do this. Give me that which I want, and you shall have this 
which you want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this man-
ner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good 
offi ces which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevo lence of the 
butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from 
their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their 
humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own nec-
essities but of their advantages.
Here is how Garnier (1802) translates the passage. Translations of self-
love are in bold, and the italics are Garnier sʼ:
Mais lʼ homme a presque continuellement besoin du secours de ses sem-
blables, et c eʼst en vain qu iʼl lʼ attendrait de leur seule bienveillance. Il 
sera bien plus sûr de son fait en sʼ adressant à leur intérêt personnel, et 
en leur persuadant qu iʼl y va de leur propre avantage de faire ce qu iʼl 
souhaite d eʼux. C eʼst ce que fait celui qui propose à un autre un marché 
quelconque; le sens de sa proposition est ceci: Donnez-moi ce dont 
jʼai besoin, et vous aurez de moi ce dont vous avez besoin vous-même; 
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6. Garnier sʼ understanding of Smith was not only infl uential through the French translation. 
The 1805 Glasgow edition of The Wealth of Nations (printed for J. & J. Scrymgeour at the 
University Press) included an English version of Garnier sʼ commentary on Smith. This edition 
was reprinted many times. According to Keith Tribe, “It can be said with some justifi cation 
that during the fi rst half of the nineteenth century the most consistently accessible guide to 
Wealth of Nations in English was that of Germain Garnier” (Tribe and Mizuta 2002, 37).
et la très-majeure partie de ces bons offi ces qui nous sont si nécessaires, 
sʼ obtiennent de cette façon. Ce nʼ est pas de la bienveillance du boucher, 
du marchand de bière ou du boulanger, que nous attendons notre dîner, 
mais bien du soin qu iʼls apportent à leurs intérêts. Nous ne nous adres-
sons pas à leur humanité, mais à leur égoïsme; et ce n eʼst jamais de nos 
besoins que nous leur parlons, c eʼst toujours de leur avantage.
Smith uses self-love twice, but Garnier chooses to translate each occur-
rence differently: intérêt personnel and égoïsme. This choice of words may 
not seem particularly problematic to the modern French reader, who is 
used to reading Smith in Garnier sʼ translation. However, Garnier sʼ choice 
was a deliberate departure from previous practice. In all French transla-
tions published before Garnier, self-love was translated as amour-propre. 
The anonymous translation of 1778 reads: “sʼ il peut intéresser leur amour-
propre en sa faveur” and “nous ne nous adressons pas à leur humanité, 
mais à leur amour-propre”7 In Blavet sʼ 1779 translation, the same pas-
sages are rendered as “en intéressant leur amour-propre en sa faveur” 
and “ce n eʼst point à leur humanité, mais à leur amour-propre que nous 
nous adressons.”8 A small variation can be observed in Roucher (1790): 
“s iʼl peut intéresser leur amour propre en sa faveur” and “nous nous 
adressons, non pas à leur humanité, mais à leur amour pour eux-mêmes” 
Only the unpublished translation by Abbé Morellet deviates from the norm. 
The fi rst occurrence reads: “lorsqu iʼl peut les disposer à ce qu iʼl désire 
par la vüe de leur propre intérêt.” Interestingly, Morellet skips the sec-
ond occurrence of self-love. He translates: “Nous ne nous adressons pas 
à leur humanité et nous ne leur parlons pas de nos besoins, mais de leur 
avantage.”9
Garnier sʼ decision to use intérêt personnel instead of amour-propre 
was perceived as signifi cant at the time. In his review of the Garnier trans-
lation, Martial Desrenaudes (1802) gave a list of what he said were errors 
in the latest edition of Blavet sʼ translation (1800), accompanied by the cor-
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7. See the “bibliothèque virtuelle” of PHARE (Pôle dʼhistoire de lʼanalyse et des repre-
sentations économiques) for an excellent electronic edition of all the passages I am discuss-
ing here (phare.univ-paris1.fr/textes/Smith/WN/index.html). I thank the editor of the site, 
Paulette Taieb, for her patience and generosity in answering my questions.
8. This translation by Abbé Blavet appeared initially in serialized fashion in the Journal 
de lʼagriculture, des arts, et du commerce et des fi nances (1779–80).
9. Abbé André Morellet, ms. 2540, Bibliothèque municipale de Lyon, quoted by Paulette 
Taieb at phare.univ-paris1.fr/textes/Smith/WN/index.html.
rect translation in Garnier. The list includes the translation of self-love: 
“A la page 25, on lit: amour propre, au lieu de, intérêt personnel (Self-
love)” (quoted in Carpenter 2002, 211). According to this early reviewer, 
translating self-love as amour-propre had been a mistake. The proper 
translation, given for the fi rst time by Garnier, was intérêt personnel.
A Short History of Self-Love
What are the implications of Garnier sʼ decision? In many ways, past 
uses of a word are still present in its current use. Amour-propre and inté-
rêt personnel are words with different histories and distinct connota-
tions. They do not belong to the same philosophical and literary traditions. 
The connotations of amour-propre in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
moral philosophy are rich and complex. Amour-propre is the translation 
of a technical term used by Renaissance humanists, philautia. It is used by 
Pascal, La Rochefoucauld, Nicole, Bayle, Voltaire, and Rousseau, among 
many others.10 The English equivalent of amour-propre throughout the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, from Hobbes to Shaftesbury, Man-
deville, Joseph Butler, and Hume, is self-love. In other words, when French 
readers see self-love in Shaftesbury or Hume, they read amour-propre, 
and when English readers see amour-propre in Nicole or Bayle, they read 
self-love. The words amour-propre and self-love carry with them the Augus-
tinian paradox that was initially formulated in La Rochefoucauld sʼ Max-
imes (1665), and subsequently popularized by Mandeville sʼ Fable of the 
Bees (1732): self-love (a vice) is the root of human virtues; private vices pro-
duce public benefi ts. The Fable of the Bees produced a fl urry of responses 
and refutations. Virtually every moral philosopher in the fi rst half of the 
eighteenth century felt compelled to articulate a response to Mandevilleʼ s 
paradox.11 Two questions were at stake in those debates: Is self-love a vice? 
Is self-love the cause of all human actions? For authors in the Augustinian 
tradition like La Rochefoucauld, Bayle, and Mandeville, both questions 
were answered in the affi rmative: self-love is a vice, and it is the cause of 
all human actions, except when God sʼ grace is at work. On the contrary, 
for Hume and Smith, self-love is neither a vice nor the cause of all human 
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10. On the history of the words philautia and amour-propre, see Fuchs 1977.
11. For an overview of the debate on self-love as a fi rst principle, see Force 2003, espe-
cially chapters 1 and 2.
actions. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, self-love is described as a 
morally neutral category, and the fi rst sentence of the book alludes to 
what Hume ([1751] 1983, 90) once called the “selfi sh hypothesis” in 
order to refute it: “How selfi sh soever man may be supposed, there are 
evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune 
of others” (Smith [1759] 1976, I.i.1). In the system that Smith develops in 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments, human behavior is derived not from 
one, but two principles: self-love and sympathy. As I argued in my recent 
book, Self-Interest before Adam Smith (2003), Smith sʼ response to Man-
deville in The Theory of Moral Sentiments is very close to the one Rous-
seau put forward a few years before in the Second Discourse, especially 
with regard to fi rst principles. Both authors respond to Mandeville sʼ expo-
sition of the selfi sh hypothesis by singling out pity, a subsidiary element 
in Mandeville sʼ narrative, and elevating it to the status of a fi rst principle. 
As fi rst principles, self-love and sympathy in Smith correspond to amour 
de soi and pitié in Rousseau (Force 2003, chap. 1). In France, aside from 
Rousseau sʼ work, the notion that self-love is the cause of all or most human 
actions was rarely challenged. The focus was on refuting the idea that 
self-love is a vice. For instance, in the “Amour-propre” article of the Diction-
naire philosophique, Voltaire ([1764] 1954) presents the selfi sh hypothe-
sis as universally acknowledged and self-evident:
Ceux qui ont dit que l aʼmour de nous-mêmes est la base de tous nos 
sentiments et de toutes nos actions ont donc eu grande raison dans 
lʼ Inde, en Espagne, et dans toute la terre habitable: et comme on nʼ écrit 
point pour prouver aux hommes qu iʼls ont un visage, il n eʼst pas besoin 
de leur prouver quʼils ont de l aʼmour-propre. Cet amour-propre est 
lʼ instrument de notre conservation; il ressemble à lʼ instrument de la 
perpétuité de lʼ espèce : il nous est nécessaire, il nous est cher, il nous 
fait plaisir, et il faut le cacher.12
On the other hand, Voltaire is vehement in his criticism of the notion that 
self-love is a vice. In another article in the Dictionnaire philosophique, he 
savages Jacques Esprit, the author of the treatise On the Falsity of Human 
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12. “Those who have said that the love of ourselves is the basis for all our feelings and all 
our actions have been quite right in India, in Spain, and all across the inhabitable earth. As 
one does not write to persuade men that they have a face, there is no need to give them proof 
that they possess self-love. Self-love is the instrument of our preservation; it resembles the 
instrument of the perpetuation of the species. We need it, it is dear to us, it gives us pleasure, 
and we must hide it.” 
Virtues, for having written that virtues cannot be genuine because they 
are based on “amour-propre”:
Quand le duc de La Rochefoucauld eut écrit ses pensées sur lʼ amour-
propre, et qu iʼl eut mis à découvert ce ressort de lʼ homme, un monsieur 
Esprit, de lʼ Oratoire, écrivit un livre captieux, intitulé: De la Fausseté 
des vertus humaines. Cet Esprit dit qu iʼl nʼy a point de vertu; mais par 
grâce il termine chaque chapitre en renvoyant à la charité chrétienne. 
Ainsi, selon le sieur Esprit, ni Caton, ni Aristide, ni Marc-Aurèle, ni Épic-
tète n éʼtaient des gens de bien; mais on nʼ en peut trouver que chez les 
chrétiens. Parmi les chrétiens, il nʼy a de vertu que chez les catholi-
ques; parmi les catholiques, il fallait encore en excepter les jésuites, 
ennemis des oratoriens; partant, la vertu ne se trouvait guère que chez 
les ennemis des jésuites. . . . Une telle insolence révolte. Je n eʼn dirai 
pas davantage, car je me mettrais en colère.13
Jacques Esprit sʼ book was a theological exposé that turned the Augus-
tinian assumptions of La Rochefoucauld sʼ Maximes into a systematic 
and explicit doctrine based on original sin and the fall of man. Because 
the Augustinian theology of the Maximes remained implicit, Voltaire and 
the philosophes could very well perform a secular reading of La Roche-
foucauld and endorse his illustration of the selfi sh hypothesis while deny-
ing that self-love was a vice. No such reading was possible with Esprit, 
who became a polemical target.
Another Port-Royal author who met the same fate was Nicole. In the 
“Intérêt” article of the Encyclopédie, Saint-Lambert (1751–72) vilifi ed 
him for writing that “amour-propre” could not be the source of virtues:
Lʼamitié sera toujours une vertu, quoiqu eʼlle ne soit fondée que sur le 
besoin quʼune âme a dʼune autre âme. 
La passion de lʼ ordre, de la justice, sera la première vertu, le véritable 
héroïsme, quoiqu eʼlle ait sa source dans lʼ amour de nous-mêmes. 
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13. “After the duke of La Rochefoucauld wrote his thoughts on self-love and uncovered 
this motive of human action, a certain Monsieur Esprit, of the Oratory, wrote a specious book 
titled On the Falsity of Human Virtues. This Esprit says there is no such thing as virtue, but 
he does us the favor of ending each chapter by mentioning Christian charity. Thus according 
to Monsieur Esprit, neither Cato, nor Aristides, nor Marcus Aurelius, nor Epictetus, were 
good people; such people can only be found among Christians. Among Christians, only Catho-
lics have virtue; among Catholics, Jesuits (enemies of the Oratorians) must be excluded; so 
much so that virtue can only be found among the Jesuitsʼ  enemies. . . . Such arrogance is revolt-
ing. I will not say more, because it would make me lose my temper.” Voltaire [1764] 1954, art. 
“Fausseté des vertus humaines.”
Voilà des vérités qui ne devraient être que triviales et jamais con-
testées; mais une classe dʼhommes du dernier siècle a voulu faire de 
lʼ amour-propre un principe toujours vicieux; cʼ est en partant d aʼprès cette 
idée que Nicole a fait vingt volumes de morale, qui ne sont quʼ un assem-
blage de sophismes méthodiquement arrangés et lourdement écrits. 
Pascal même, le grand Pascal, a voulu regarder en nous comme une 
imperfection ce sentiment de lʼ amour de nous-mêmes que Dieu nous a 
donné. . . . M. de la Rochefoucauld qui sʼ exprimait avec précision et avec 
grâce, a écrit presque dans le même esprit que Pascal et Nicole; . . . Ce 
livre de M. de la Rochefoucauld, celui de Pascal, qui étaient entre les 
mains de tout le monde, ont insensiblement accoutumé le public fran-
çais à prendre toujours le mot d aʼmour-propre en mauvaise part; et il 
nʼy a pas longtemps quʼun petit nombre dʼhommes commence à nʼy 
plus attacher nécessairement les idées de vice, d oʼrgueil, etc.14
This passage is particularly interesting for our purposes because it spells 
out the connotations of the word amour-propre in the middle of the eigh-
teenth century. The word is still associated with the Augustinian critique 
of virtues, which had become almost a matter of conventional wisdom 
with the success of Pascalʼ s Pensées, La Rochefoucauld sʼ Maximes, and 
Nicole sʼ Essais de morale. At the same time, Saint-Lambert presents the 
encyclopédistes as a small group of enlightened men whose critique of the 
critique of virtues was only beginning to change the connotations asso-
ciated with the word amour-propre.
A common practice among eighteenth-century philosophers consisted 
in presenting philosophical disputes as semantic ones. Near the begin-
ning of De l eʼsprit, in a chapter titled “On the Abuse of Words,” Helvétius 
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14. “Friendship will always be a virtue, even though it is based on the need a soul has for 
another soul.
Love of order, justice, will always be the prime virtue and the true heroism, even though it 
has its source in the love of oneself.
These truths should be commonplace and never questioned, but a certain group of people 
in the last century meant to turn self-love into an ever-maligned principle.
This was the basis on which Nicole made twenty volumes of morals, which are but a col-
lection of methodically arranged and gracelessly written sophisms.
Pascal himself, the great Pascal, meant to view as an imperfection this love of ourselves 
that God gave us. . . . M. de La Rochefoucauld, who expressed himself with precision and 
grace, wrote nearly in the same spirit as Pascal and Nicole. . . . La Rochefoucauld sʼ book, and 
Pascal sʼ, which were in everybody sʼ hands, have gradually accustomed the French public to 
take the word self-love always in a bad sense. It is only recently that a small number of men 
have begun to dissociate it from the ideas of vice, pride, etc.”
(1758, I, IV) discusses the meaning of amour-propre in La Rochefou-
cauld. He claims that readers have misunderstood the word by asso ciating 
it with vices like pride and vanity:
Lorsque le célebre M De La Rochefoucault dit que lʼ amour-propre est 
le principe de toutes nos actions, combien lʼ ignorance de la vraie signi-
fi cation de ce mot amour-propre ne souleva-t-elle pas de gens contre 
cet illustre auteur? On prit lʼ amour-propre pour orgueil et vanité; et lʼ on 
s iʼmagina, en conséquence, que M De La Rochefoucault plaçoit dans 
le vice la source de toutes les vertus. Il étoit cependant facile d aʼpper-
cevoir que lʼ amour-propre, ou lʼ amour de soi, n éʼtoit autre chose quʼun 
sentiment gravé en nous par la nature; que ce sentiment se transformoit 
dans chaque homme en vice ou en vertu, selon les goûts et les passions 
qui lʼ animoient; et que lʼ amour-propre, différemment modifi é, produi-
soit également lʼ orgueil et la modestie.15
While he claims La Rochefoucauld as a predecessor, Helvétius, presum-
ably because of the moral and religious connotations still attached to the 
word, never uses amour-propre in his own doctrine. Instead, he uses inté-
rêt personnel (self-interest):
Quel homme, en effet, sʼ il sacrifi e lʼ orgueil de se dire plus vertueux que 
les autres à lʼ orgueil dʼêtre plus vrai, et s iʼl sonde, avec une attention 
scrupu leuse, tous les replis de son ame, ne sʼ appercevra pas que c eʼst 
uniquement à la maniere différente dont lʼ intérêt personnel se modifi e, 
que lʼ on doit ses vices et ses vertus? Que tous les hommes sont mus 
par la même force?16
Helvétius agrees with his fellow encyclopédistes that the word amour-
propre should be free from the moral and religious connotations that are 
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15. “When the famous M. de La Rochefoucauld said that self-love is the principle of all 
our actions, how many people, ignorant as they were of the true meaning of the word self-
love, did not rise against this illustrious author? They took self-love to mean pride and vanity; 
consequently, they imagined that M. de La Rochefoucauld held vice to be the source of all 
virtues. Yet it was easy to see that self-love, or the love of oneself, is nothing but a feeling that 
nature has engraved in us; that such feeling is transformed into a vice or a virtue within each 
man according to the tastes and the passions that animate him; that self-love, differently modi-
fi ed, can result in pride as well as in modesty.”
16. “What man, if he gives up the pride of claiming a superior virtue for the pride of being 
more truthful, if he scrupulously looks into the recesses of his soul, will not realize that vir-
tues and vices arise exclusively from the various ways in which self-interest is modifi ed? That 
all men are driven by the same power?” (Helvétius 1758, I, II, III).
traditionally associated with it. Yet, after arguing about the meaning of 
amour-propre, he takes the additional step of dispensing with the word 
altogether, and using a word with much less baggage: intérêt personnel, 
which was not widely used until the 1740s and was free of the negative 
overtones of amour-propre.17 The word is perfectly suited to designate 
the fi rst principle in Helvétiusʼ s doctrine: a natural impulse that is univer-
sal, morally neutral, and the cause of all human actions.
If intérêt personnel was new and relatively free of connotations in 
1758, at the beginning of the nineteenth century it was very much asso-
ciated with the doctrine of Helvétius and neo-Epicureanism in general. 
A good witness to this fact is Mme de Staël (1807). On the one hand, she 
complains, in a very general way, that the nineteenth century seems to 
be the century of intérêt personnel: “Nous vivons dans un siècle où lʼ in-
térêt personnel semble le seul principe de toutes les actions des hom-
mes.”18 On the other hand, she assigns a clear genealogy to this way of 
thinking. Staël ([1810] 1958–60, 284) distinguishes between a French 
philosophical school (Helvétius, Diderot, Saint-Lambert) whose ethics 
was based on the principle of intérêt personnel, and an English school 
(Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith) that rejected the selfi sh 
hypothesis:
De la morale fondée sur lʼ intérêt personnel.
Les écrivains français ont eu tout-à-fait raison de considérer la 
morale fondée sur lʼ intérêt comme une conséquence de la métaphysi-
que qui attribuoit toutes les idées aux sensations. S iʼl nʼy a rien dans 
lʼ âme que ce que les sensations y ont mis, lʼ agréable ou le désagréable 
doit être lʼ unique mobile de notre volonté. Helvétius, Diderot, Saint-
Lambert nʼont pas dévié de cette ligne, et ils ont expliqué toutes les 
actions, y compris le dévouement des martyrs, par lʼ amour de soi-
même. Les anglais, qui, pour la plupart, professent en métaphysique 
la philosophie expérimentale, n oʼnt jamais pu supporter cependant 
la morale fondée sur lʼ intérêt. Shaftsbury [sic], Hutcheson, Smith, etc., 
ont proclamé le sens moral, et la sympathie, comme la source de toutes 
les vertus. Hume lui-même, le plus sceptique des philosophes anglais, 
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17. According to the ARTFL database, the earliest occurrence of intérêt personnel is in 
Cardinal de Retz sʼ Mémoires (1717).
18. “We live in a century in which self-interest seems to be the only principle of human 
actions.” 
n aʼ pu lire sans dégoût cette théorie de lʼ amour de soi, qui fl étrit la 
beauté de lʼ âme.19
As to the word égoïsme, it is fairly new when Garnier uses it in 1802. 
Like intérêt personnel, it is not common until the middle of the eigh-
teenth century,20 and both words are often used as synonyms.21
When Roucher, Blavet, and the anonymous translator of 1778 use amour-
propre to translate self-love, their choice is consistent with a philosophical 
tradition going back to the seventeenth century, a tradition in which En glish 
and French authors continuously respond to each other. In this dialogue, 
amour-propre means self-love and self-love means amour-propre. At the 
same time, because amour-propre and self-love are so widely used, and 
especially used in polemical contexts, their very defi nition is at stake in the 
constant battle between advocates and adversaries of the selfi sh hypothe-
sis. Consequently, in the 1780s and 1790s, someone seeing amour-propre 
twice in the same paragraph of the French translation of The Wealth of 
Nations would, at least in some way, also remember the complicated his-
tory of the word: its longstanding association with the critique of virtues, 
the efforts by the philosophes to dissociate it from the critique of virtues, 
and Rousseau sʼ claim that self-love is not the cause of all human actions. 
These connotations are roughly equivalent to the connotations of self-
love in 1776: its early association with Mandevilleʼ s paradox, and the refu-
tation of this paradox by Butler, Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith himself.
On the other hand, the words Garnier uses in 1802, intérêt personnel 
and égoïsme, are more univocal. They have a shorter history behind them, 
and they are associated with a neo-Epicurean approach that tends to explain 
all human behavior on the basis of a single principle: Helvétius often calls 
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19. “On ethical systems based on self-interest.
French writers have been quite right to see the ethical system based on self-interest as a 
consequence of the metaphysical doctrine that derived all ideas from sensations. If there is 
nothing in the soul but that which sensations have put in it, pleasure and pain must be the only 
motives underlying our will. Helvétius, Diderot, Saint-Lambert never deviated from this line, 
and they explained all actions, including the sacrifi ce of martyrs, by referring to the love of 
oneself. As to the English, even though most of them adhere to experimental philosophy 
when it comes to metaphysics, they have never tolerated these ethical systems based on self-
interest. Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Smith, etc., have held that moral sense and sympathy are the 
source of all virtues. Even Hume, the most skeptical of English philosophers, could not read 
without disgust this theory of the love of oneself, which tarnished the soul sʼ beauty.”
20. According to the ARTFL database, the earliest occurrence of égoïsme is in 1757.
21. For instance: “Voilà où vous conduit le detestable intérêt personnel, l éʼgoïsme réduit en 
action” (Abbé Barruel [1781] 1830, 148).
it intérêt personnel (self-interest) but also simply intérêt (interest), and 
sometimes plaisir (pleasure).
Intérêt Personnel as a First Principle
At the same time, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the complex 
connotations of amour-propre are beginning to fade away, and the word 
is gradually restricted to the narrower meaning it has in modern French: 
personal vanity. This evolution appears very clearly in the successive edi-
tions of Jean-Baptiste Say sʼ Traité d éʼconomie politique. In the “Discours 
préliminaire” of the original edition (1803), Say distinguishes between 
vanité personnelle and intérêt personnel as motives that may cloud some-
one sʼ judgments on economic issues:
De ce que lʼ Economie politique est lʼ affaire de tout le monde, naît un 
autre genre de diffi culté: c eʼst qu oʼn a pour juges, non seulement ceux 
qui se sont occupés des ces matières, mais encore ceux qui nʼy enten-
dent rien. Comme chacun a donné quelques soins aux valeurs dont sa 
fortune est composée, chacun se croit en droit d aʼvoir une opinion sur 
les valeurs, une opinion qui se trouve exaltée par la vanité personnelle, 
comme toutes les opinions, et de plus par lʼ intérêt personnel, qui, à 
notre insu, exerce tant d eʼmpire sur nos jugements. (1:xl)22
In the second edition (1814) Say proposes a variation on the same thought, 
but the keywords are almost the same:
Les opinions en économie politique ont même ce malheur particulier, 
c eʼst qu eʼlles ne se trouvent pas seulement soutenues par la vanité, la 
plus universelle des infi rmités humaines, mais par lʼ intérêt personnel 
qui ne lʼ est guère moins, et qui, à notre insu, et malgré nous, exerce tant 
d eʼmpire sur notre façon de penser. (1:lxviij)23
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22. “The fact that political economy is everybody sʼ business causes another kind of diffi -
culty: one is judged not only by those who have studied these matters, but also by those who 
misunderstand them entirely. Since everybody has given some thought to the investments that 
make up his own wealth, everybody thinks he is entitled to an opinion on investments, an 
opinion that happens to be exalted by personal vanity [vanité personnelle], as all opinions 
are, and also by self-interest [intérêt personnel], which infl uences our judgments so greatly, 
and in ways we do not realize.”
23. “Opinions in political economy have the distinct misfortune of being sustained not 
only by vanity [vanité] (the most universal of human weaknesses) but also by self-interest 
[intérêt personnel], which isnʼt much less universal, and infl uences our manner of thinking so 
greatly, and in ways we cannot help and do not realize.”
In the fi fth edition (1826), however, a major change occurs:
Lorsquʼune fois un auteur a manifesté une opinion, la vanité, la plus 
universelle des infi rmités humaines, veut qu iʼl la soutienne. Lʼ intérêt 
personnel se joint quelquefois à lʼamour-propre; et lʼ on sait quelle 
infl uence il exerce, même à notre insu, sur nos opinions. De là les doc-
trines hasardées qu oʼn voit naître chaque jour et les objections qu oʼn 
reproduit après qu eʼlles ont été cent fois réfutées. (1:xc)24
In 1826, the meaning of amour-propre has diverged so much from the 
meaning of intérêt personnel that Say does not hesitate to use both words 
in the same paragraph in order to designate psychological motives that 
work together but are entirely distinct. In fact, it can be shown that the 
modern meaning of amour-propre was present in Say sʼ thinking as early 
as 1817. In the fi rst edition of his small volume on morals and customs, 
Say (1817, 83) made a clear distinction between amour-propre and intérêt, 
and he equated amour-propre with vanity:
Les philosophes moralistes paraissent croire que lʼ amour de soi, lʼ in-
térêt, dirige les actions des hommes plus que ne le fait lʼ amour-propre, 
la vanité. Je pense au contraire que la vanité exerce sur eux plus d eʼm-
pire, généralement parlant, que lʼ amour de soi. Il suffi t d oʼbserver dans 
combien de cas les hommes agissent par vanité dʼune manière oppo-
sée à leurs intérêts, depuis lʼ enfant qui blessé dʼune mortifi cation qu oʼn 
lui a fait essuyer, boude contre son ventre, jusqu aʼu potentat à qui lʼ on 
fait faire tant de sottise en le fl attant, et qui détruit son pays, c eʼst-à-
dire le fondement de sa puissance pour se venger dʼune insulte de 
gazette.25
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24. “Once an author has professed an opinion, vanity [vanité], the most universal of human 
weaknesses, causes him to defend it. Self-interest [intérêt personnel] sometimes supplements 
self-importance [amour-propre]: it is well known how much it affects our opinions, even when 
we do not realize it. Hence these haphazard doctrines we see cropping up every day, and the 
objections one sees repeated even after these doctrines have been refuted a hundred times.”
25. “Moral philosophers seem to believe that the love of oneself [amour de soi], or self-
interest [intérêt], drives the actions of men more than self-importance [amour-propre], or 
vanity [vanité]. I believe, on the contrary, that vanity has more power over them, generally 
speaking, than the love of oneself. It suffi ces to observe how many times men act out of vanity 
in a way that is contrary to their interests, from the child whose pride was wounded by some 
punishment and who reacts by abstaining from eating, to the potentate who can be fl attered 
into making so many silly decisions and who destroys his country, i.e., the foundation for his 
power, in order to hit back those who insulted him in a gazette.”
In this passage, amour-propre is explicitly presented as a synonym for 
vanité. Another remarkable example of the same use of amour-propre can 
be found in Say sʼ (1825, 578) reply to Storch sʼ accusation of plagiarism:
Dans ces notes, je crois ne mʼêtre écarté en rien des égards que se doi-
vent deux écrivains qui, avec des intentions droites, cultivent la même 
science. Lʼ amour-propre un peu trop susceptible de M. Storch n eʼn a 
pas jugé ainsi.26
In these two examples as in the 1826 version of the Traité d éʼconomie 
politique, amour-propre (self-importance) has to do with self-image, self-
delusion, and irrational behavior, and its connotation is entirely negative. 
Intérêt personnel (self-interest) is more ambiguous. On the one hand, it 
is the impulse that causes us to prefer ourselves to others and makes us 
biased in the evaluation of the opinions we profess; on the other hand, it is 
the drive behind economic activity, the motive that prompts human beings 
to save and invest. When Say elaborates on the parts of The Wealth of 
Nations that discuss the role of private interests in the optimal allocation 
of capital, he uses the word intérêt personnel:
Il est heureux que lʼintérêt personnel veille sans cesse à la conserva-
tion des capitaux des particuliers, et qu oʼn ne puisse en aucun temps 
distraire un capital dʼun emploi productif, sans se priver dʼun revenu 
proportionné.
Smith pense qu eʼn tout pays, la profusion ou lʼ impéritie de certains 
particuliers, et des administrateurs de la fortune publique, est plus que 
compensée par la frugalité de la majorité des citoyens, et par le soin 
qu iʼls prennent de leurs intérêts. (1841, 116)27
Similarly, in a passage that develops Smith sʼ view on the freedom of trade, 
Say argues that the criterion for deciding whether a particular good should 
be purchased locally or imported is intérêt personnel:
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26. “In these notes, I think I have never failed to show the respect that two well-meaning 
writers who cultivate the same science owe one another. Mr. Storch sʼ over-sensitive vanity 
disagrees.”
27. “It is fortunate that self-interest [intérêt personnel] should constantly take care of the 
preservation of private capital, and that it should be impossible to divert some capital from a 
productive use without forfeiting the corresponding income.
Smith believes that in every country, the profl igacy and incompetence of some individu-
als and of the administrators of the public sʼ wealth is more than offset by the frugality of the 
majority of the citizens and by the care with which they attend to their own interests [leurs 
intérêts].”
Le sacrifi ce au prix duquel nous obtenons des étrangers cette matière 
première, n aʼ rien de plus fâcheux que le sacrifi ce des avances et des 
consommations que nous fesons en chaque genre de production pour 
obtenir un nouveau produit. Lʼintérêt personnel est toujours le meilleur 
juge de lʼ étendue de ce sacrifi ce et de lʼ étendue du dédommagement 
qu oʼn peut s eʼn promettre; et quoique lʼintérêt personnel se trompe 
quelquefois, c eʼst, au demeurant, le juge le moins dangereux, et celui 
dont les jugemens coûtent le moins. (1841, 156)28
The importance of the concept of intérêt personnel for French readers 
of Smith at the beginning of the nineteenth century is underscored by 
the presence of an index entry titled “INTÉRÊT privé ou personnel” in 
the Garnier translation in 1802. The entry refers to four passages in The 
Wealth of Nations where Smith discusses the relationship between pri-
vate interests and the public interest, and the role of private interests in 
the optimal allocation of capital:
INTÉRÊT privé ou personnel. Dans lʼ état de liberté, dirige lʼ industrie 
vers la route la plus profi table à toute la société. III, 58. Et tout capital 
vers lʼ emploi le plus conforme à lʼ intérêt général. Id, 435. Est un guide 
plus sûr, à cet égard, que tout homme dʼEtat ou législateur quelconque. 
Id., 60. Ce concours entre lʼ intérêt privé et lʼ intérêt public est dérangé 
par les réglemens du système commercial, et comment. Id., 436.29
Remarkably, in the index that appears for the fi rst time in the third edition 
of The Wealth of Nations (1784),30 there is no such entry. Self-interest or 
private interest are nowhere mentioned as keywords.31 On the other hand, 
this index has an entry for self-love, defi ned as “the governing principle 
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28. “The sacrifi ce involved in obtaining this commodity from abroad is not more painful 
than the sacrifi ce involved in the investment and consumption necessary to obtain a new 
product. Self-interest [intérêt personnel] is always the best judge to determine how large the 
sacrifi ce is and how large the corresponding reward must be; even though self-interest [inté-
rêt personnel] is sometimes mistaken, it is still the safest judge, and the least costly.”
29. “INTEREST (Private or Self-) [INTÉRÊT (privé ou personnel)]. In the state of liberty, 
directs the industry on the path most profi table to society as a whole. III, 58. And all capital 
toward the use most consistent with the public interest. Id., 435. Is a better guide, in that 
respect, than any statesman or legislator. Id., 60. This agreement between private interest and 
the public interest is disturbed by the regulations of the commercial system. How. Id., 436.”
30. See Haakonssen and Skinner 2001.
31. There is an entry for interest in the sense of monetary interest. See Haakonssen and 
Skinner 2001, 193. The word self-interest appears only once in The Wealth of Nations, in the 
context of a discussion of religion (v.i.g.2).
in the intercourse of human society” (Haakonssen and Skinner 2001, 203). 
The reference is of course to the only passage where the word appears, 
the second chapter of book 1, which discusses the causes of the division 
of labor.
Why is self-love a keyword, while there is no entry for words like inter-
est, private interest, or self-interest? It is because the word self-love is 
used in the only passage in The Wealth of Nations where Smith discusses 
(or at least comes close to discussing) fi rst principles.32 As we have seen 
before, self-love is a widely used concept that is almost always used as a 
fi rst principle in eighteenth-century moral philosophy. On the other hand, 
if we check the passages where Garnier uses avantage personnel or inté-
rêt personnel against the original English, we will fi nd that Smith uses 
expressions like his own advantage or his own interest. The passage that 
the Garnier index summarizes as “INTÉRÊT privé ou personnel. Dans 
lʼ état de liberté, dirige lʼ industrie vers la route la plus profi table à toute la 
société” is the very famous passage where the invisible hand appears. Here 
is how it reads in Garnier:
En cela, comme dans beaucoup d aʼutres cas, il est conduit par une main 
invisible, pour remplir une fi n qui nʼ entre nullement dans ses intentions; 
et ce nʼ est pas toujours ce qu iʼl y a de plus mal pour la société, que cette 
fi n n eʼntre pour rien dans ses intentions. Tout en ne cherchant que son 
intérêt personnel, il travaille souvent dʼune manière bien plus effi -
cace pour l iʼntérêt de la société, que s iʼl avait réellement pour but dʼy 
travailler.33
In the original English, the expression that corresponds to “tout en ne 
cherchant que son intérêt personnel” is “by pursuing his own interest.” In 
French, intérêt personnel sounds very much like a basic concept, a fi rst 
principle that deserves its own entry in the index. This is confi rmed by 
the fact that Jean-Baptiste Say, the leading interpreter of Smith at the 
time, uses intérêt personnel whenever he elaborates on the passages from 
book 4 of The Wealth of Nations that are mentioned in Gar nier sʼ index 
entry. In the original English, however, it is much more diffi cult to read an 
expression like his own interest as a basic concept, especially since there 
is no entry for words like personal interest or self-interest in the index. 
Only the passage from book 1 where the word self-love appears can be 
construed as referring to fi rst principles.
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32. For a discussion of the status of self-love as a fi rst principle in The Wealth of Nations, 
see Force 2003, 121–34.
33. Translation of The Wealth of Nations, IV.ii.9.
This is where Garnier sʼ choice of intérêt personnel instead of amour-
propre has the weightiest consequences. In all previous translations, amour-
propre appeared only at the beginning of the book, just as self-love does 
in the original. In the Garnier translation, intérêt personnel appears not 
only at the beginning (to translate self-love), but also in book 4 (to trans-
late his own interest). Thanks to the use of an identical word, a conceptual 
connection is established between the principle underlying the division 
of labor (in book 1), and the principle underlying saving and investment 
(in book 4). This connection is established not only with the specifi c 
passage in book 4 where Garnier uses intérêt personnel, but also in the 
many passages in book 4 where Garnier uses intérêt and intérêts privés to 
translate Smith sʼ analysis of the relationship between private interests and 
the public interest. Whereas Smith uses a variety of words and concepts, 
Garnier uses just one: intérêt personnel. Translate intérêt personnel back 
into English: instead of the variety of words Smith uses, you will have only 
one word, self-interest. In Garnier sʼ translation, Smith sʼ system seems to 
be entirely derived from the axiom of self-interest. This axiomatic coher-
ence (which is far from obvious in Smithʼ s original text) is of course char-
acteristic of the orthodox school that developed in the fi rst half of the 
nineteenth century. What is remarkable is that many years before there was 
an orthodox school, its assumptions regarding self-interest were already 
present in Garnier sʼ translation.
It would of course be an exaggeration to claim that Garnier sʼ translation 
is the prime motivating factor behind the conventional reading of The 
Wealth of Nations: self-interest is the fi rst principle of Smith sʼ doctrine 
and of economic science in general.34 I would simply submit that Gar nier sʼ 
choice of words and Say sʼ enthusiastic endorsement of this choice are an 
early manifestation of what would later cohere into the modern, conven-
tional reading of Smith. When economics asserted itself as a science 
in the nineteenth century, it relied on Bentham, rather than Smith, for its 
psychological assumptions. It that sense, the psychological underpinnings 
of orthodox economic theory were neo-Epicurean, and, beyond Bentham, 
they could be traced back to Helvétius. As Henry Sidg wick put it in 1877, 
“The premises of Bentham are all clearly given by Helvetius,” whose psy-
chological theory was very clear and simple:
Helvetius puts with a highly effective simplicity, from which Hume 
was precluded by his more subtle and complex psychological analysis, 
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34. For instance, see Stigler 1971, 265, which characterizes The Wealth of Nations as “a 
stupendous palace erected upon the granite of self-interest.”
these two doctrines: fi rst, that every human being “en tout temps, en tout 
lieu” seeks his own interest, and judges of things and persons according 
as they promote it; and secondly, that, as the public is made up of indi-
viduals, the qualities that naturally and normally gain public esteem 
and are called virtues are those useful to the public. (638)
Given the widespread acceptance of these psychological assumptions 
among economists, it is not surprising that The Wealth of Nations was 
read and interpreted from a neo-Epicurean or utilitarian point of view. 
This produced a number of puzzles, the most famous being the “Adam 
Smith problem,” which was initially formulated by Lujo Brentano in 1877. 
Brentano perceived a contradiction between the explicit rejection of the 
selfi sh hypothesis in The Theory of Moral Sentiments and what he saw 
as an endorsement of the same hypothesis in The Wealth of Nations. He 
accounted for the discrepancy by supposing that, after writing The Theory 
of Moral Sentiments, Smith had discovered and adopted the views of Hel-
vé tius on self-interest. According to Brentano (1891, 64), The Wealth of 
Nations was based on the psychological theory of Helvétius:
In the “Investigations into the Wealth of Nations,” on the contrary, he 
holds entirely to the views of the book of Helvetius upon the nature of 
man, and regards selfi shness as the only motive of human action. The 
consequences of this dogma of selfi shness permeate almost all parts of 
his work.35
The idea that Smith might have borrowed from the philosopher of self-
interest was discarded a long time ago (see Oncken 1897). Still, this read-
ing of Smith is quite plausible if one uses the French translation (as many 
nineteenth-century economists did) instead of the original.
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